The Criminal Jury, Nullfication, and Open Governance by Carroll, Jenny E.
 – 29 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
THE CRIMINAL JURY, NULLFICATION, 
AND OPEN GOVERNANCE  
by Jenny E. CARROLL, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall 
University School of Law (United States). 
 
 
he movement towards open governance has encouraged 
not only transparency, but direct citizen participation in 
government. In reality, however large swaths of the actual 
experience of governance and law-making unaccounted for. Even 
as notions of governance have evolved, they seem to hover around 
an underlying notion that there is a separation between those who 
make laws and those to whom the law is applied. To the extent that 
there is overlap in these realms, it is that those who occupy the 
formal spaces where law is created are also subject to those laws. 
Ordinary citizens are the recipients, not the creators, of law. Even 
as proponents and theorists have recognized that the call to open 
governance pushes those in power to account for law-making that 
occurs through interpretation,1 the realm of that interpretation 
remains in those narrow spaces of formal governance. Thus, even 
among those open governance advocates who would move 
governance away from its positivist and formalist roots, the power 
of law-making remains in particular and designated spaces, 
separated from the very people whom the law would govern. 
Jury nullification is rarely discussed in the context of open 
governance movements. Nullification, or the possibility that a 
citizen juror would interpret the law, seems counter to the primary 
ideals of the movement’s allegiance to transparency and order – 
that laws are knowable in advance of any particular case, created 
and applied in a uniform manner, and there is a separation between 
the governed and the government establishes this order, that they 
are knowable promotes transparency. But this failure to account 
for jury nullification (or the role of jurors in the open governance 
movement) is a mistake. To the extent that traditional models of 
governance and the rule of law establishes a distant (and from the 
perspective of the citizen, passive) relationship between the citizen 
and his government; nullification challenges this relationship. It 
opens the possibility that a juror, with no greater qualification than 
the fact of his citizenry (and his ability to survive the voir dire 
process) is an appropriate source of law. The citizen’s role shifts 
                                                
1 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 163 (3d ed. 2009) (describing the 
importance of incorporating interpretation into the rule of law rendering “law … the art 
of governance by rules, rather than an automated machinery of enforcement”); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 166 (1986) (arguing that in order for a State or its laws to 
maintain integrity, they must engage in a process of interpretation premised on consistent 
and agreed upon principles); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT O F LAW 125 (1961) (describing 
law as a process of creating and then interpretation in order to achieve acceptance); Cass 
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959-68 (1995) (arguing that law draws 
meaning not only from construction but interpretation).  
T 
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from the law’s passive recipient to the law’s active creator, through 
his interpretation and application of the law as juror. With this 
shift, a new conception of law is born – one flowing from both 
formal and informal sources, which includes jurors engaged in 
nullification. This conception of law, and governance under it, is 
not only a more accurate presentation of law-making in a 
democracy; but counter intuitively it supports transparency by 
directly involving the citizen in the law-making process. Accepting 
that jurors play a vital role in open governance, recognizes that the 
value of the law is not only in its predictability, but also in its ability 
to be responsive to the citizen’s own lives and to conform with the 
citizen’s expectations and understanding of the law.  
This paper embraces a vision of open governance that preserves 
the vital role that mechanisms of direct citizen construction of law, 
including nullification, can play within a system by preserving 
notions of justice and law that is truly cognizable to the citizenry. I 
reject the limited view that law creation and interpretation must 
occur only in formal realms of government runs and argue that to 
do so is to risk moving the law further and further away from the 
citizen’s own sense of what the law is and what it ought to be. In 
this sense, allowing jurors to directly interpret the law a dialogue is 
opened between the formerly static construct and the ordinary 
citizen. In this sense, the jury plays a role that members of the 
formal branches may be unable or unwilling to do – they construct 
law that is both public and predictable to the masses from which 
they are drawn. This is not to say that juries are the only component 
of open governance, or that they should displace the authority of 
formal bodies to create and interpret law, or that there are not ways 
to improve juror transparency, but it is to say that jurors act as a 
critical check in cases where the ideal of a knowable and 
transparent law has been displaced by an overly formal construct.  
THE JURY AND OPEN GOVERNANCE 
To accept that open governance should encompass jury’s raises the 
more difficult question how the jury should fill this role and what 
limitations should be placed on it. In answering question there are 
known quantities. Governance emerges as a story about spaces – 
the places, real or theoretical, in which law is made and obedience 
acquired (or demanded). The open governance movement seeks to 
define the boundaries of those spaces and, in the process, to define 
the concept of law and government itself.  
Contemporary debate about open governance has struggled to 
reconcile its promise of a predictable, knowable, stabile law with 
the reality that rules, laws, and even the government itself exist in 
context – the spaces of people’s real lives – and are subject to 
interpretation and re-imagination. The governance itself is bound 
on all sides by the need for a normative consensus that allows the 
law to demand obedience through the acceptance of the law by the 
citizens. The law may govern the community, but the community 
must have some space to shape the law. At the end of the day, the 
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rules or norms are only as effective as their ability to resonate with 
the community’s own notion of law and governance. 
In moments of disconnect, when the law is discordant with the 
community’s values or expectations, it loses its power and the 
underlying aim of open governance is defeated. The law becomes 
a foreign body that cannot be repaired with traditional notions of 
open governance. To retain its link to the community norms, 
government must re-conceive of the relationship it seeks to create 
between the citizen and his government and, in the process, the 
law itself. This notion is inherent in open government’s conception 
of law and governance as it rejects the ideal that the relationship 
between the citizen and the government as a distant one, with 
formal bodies creating law that the citizen must learn to accept and 
recognize, or reject. This law might well attempt to reflect the 
underlying values of the community or its historical past, but it is 
created outside of the community itself. This construction of law 
inevitably fails because it belies the reality that, inevitably, the law 
and the citizen must occupy the same space; the very meaning of 
the law is drawn from the lives of the citizens it governs and their 
expectations of the law within their lives. To accelerate the space 
between the people and the law is to construct a law that circles 
ever further away from those from whom it would demand 
obedience.  
But to reduce the space between the citizen and the law, and to 
reinvigorate the relationship between the citizen and her 
government is to construct a law that jettisons some of the 
formalistic premises in favor of the normative experiences of those 
to whom the law applies.2 While abandoning rigid application may 
inject a degree of uncertainty into the law and governance, even the 
most ardent proponents of formalism would not argue that the 
government’s or law’s redeeming principle is consistency for 
consistency sake.3 The law serves many masters – empowering 
some, controlling or protecting others – but in the criminal system, 
its ultimate goal is always some larger concept of justice.4 When 
consistent application of the law alone will undermine that larger 
aim, there must be a mechanism within the system to construct 
new meaning,5 to bend the law around the lives it encounters to 
achieve its ultimate ends.6 
                                                
2 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 959-68 (arguing that the rule of law must be animated by many 
sources and cannot rely on mechanical application in the hopes of achieving a “just” 
result). 
3 As Dworkin aptly noted, at the end of the day, the rule of law must be a functional ideal. 
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 190. 
4 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 265, 267 
(arguing that rule of law ultimately must be driven by both “coherence and justice” for 
both the courts and the citizens). 
5 Id.  
6 As will be discussed further in Part III it is important that this mechanism be 
incorporated into the system itself, less the rule of law be undermined. Without such a 
mechanism, the system risks the allegiance of its citizenry. If the citizens cease to 
recognize the law, it loses meaning in their lives, even that meaning that was previously 
accepted. Laws that were once obeyed, and perhaps still consistent with the citizens’ 
expectation at the time they were enacted, emerge as part of a foreign system aligned with 
discordant law. 
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In short, a construction of law and in the process governance that 
is drawn from many sources, including those it seeks to govern may 
actually enrich governance. The creation of rule, or even a general 
principle to guide that rule, does not alone create law. The writing 
that would codify and memorialize some collective value or 
morality in the name of open or participatory governance is only 
the beginning (or maybe the middle) of the story that is the law. 
The writing is simultaneously a fixed and ambiguous point. It is 
fixed in that it is unchanging (though not unchangeable). It remains 
long after the wars, the elections, and the debates have ended. 
Absent some extraordinary moment of repeal, it lingers, even if 
unenforced, as law capable at any moment of demanding allegiance 
or punishment. But the text alone is incapable of imaging the lives 
of those to whom it might apply. It is composed of generalities. It 
is both over- and under-inclusive from the moment it is set to 
paper. It cannot contemplate some future scenario when the 
words, applied formally, would confound their own purpose and 
produce an unjust result. 
Like all creatures constructed of words, the written law is also, in 
its stasis, ambiguous. Its language obscures and eludes meaning at 
the moment of contact with the normative world. Someone must 
give meaning to the words. Someone must interpret the law. 
Interpretation imperils predictability, knowability and stability. As 
the executive and judiciary define the parameters of the law 
through interpretation and application, even the plainest of text 
may take on meanings increasingly distant from the understanding 
of ordinary folks who live in the shadow of the law. Words 
abandon their common or understood meanings and become 
terms of art; complex to the point of incomprehension with their 
interpretive glosses. Statutes with vague or open textured language 
are particularly vulnerable. Secondary or appellate courts with their 
allegiance to elaborate legal tests and the inevitable carving out of 
exceptions and exceptions to exception over time only compound 
the problem. In time, the citizens’ ability to know the law presents 
as a near impossible ideal. 
Each layer of interpretation carries a power all its own. It writes 
meaning over and onto the words of the statute, seeking to lend 
the citizen a context and history through which his expectation of 
the law can be shaped. But at some point, in a quiet space removed 
from the formal rooms of this previous construction, the citizen 
lays the written word and the history it carries next to the story of 
his own life and seeks a common meaning. When that 
commonality is elusive, when the formal construction of the law’s 
meaning is too rigid or otherwise confounds the citizen’s notions 
of morality or the purpose of the law itself, the citizen may seek 
reconciliation, an integration of the law’s formalism with the 
normative experience they together – the law and citizen – occupy. 
Failing that, he will write a new meaning in his resistance. 
This is the embodiment of open government. This push to 
accommodate the reality that rigid application of the law 
undermines its purpose. These ideals describe law as a body 
The Criminal Jury, Nullfication, and Open Governance – Jenny E. Carroll 
– 33 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
constructed and drawing meaning from many sources. 7 But these 
ideals are limited in the sources of interpretation they will consider.8 
They fail to contemplate the citizen’s own moment of 
interpretation as a possible source of law believing that such an 
informal source of law might undermine predictability and stability. 
But in this they overlook the possibility that the citizen may possess 
a power of interpretation that formal branches lack. Jurors, by the 
very nature that they are ordinary citizens drawn from the 
community where the crime allegedly occurred, are in a unique 
position to consider the law in the context of a common 
community understanding. Where courts and prosecutors may 
speak of the formal meaning of statutory terms, the citizen 
interprets the language of the statute in lived terms lending the 
possibility of a new, more nuanced meaning and one that is more 
consistent with the citizens’ expectation of the law.9 In this sense, 
the juror may create transparency, stability, and predictability in the 
law in ways that has alluded formal construct alone.10 Granting 
juries the authority to interpret law will not displace executive 
discretion in application or judicial interpretation, but granting 
juries the power to nullify can allow the citizen to serve a unique 
function. It allows the citizen to check oppressive applications of 
the law in cases in which formal construction of the law has 
destroyed its predictability and distanced it from the very people it 
would govern. 
A wider conception of law that draws meaning both from formal 
sources and from the lives of the people who live under it may 
ultimately prove more useful in achieving the underlying aims of 
open governance than reliance on formal sources alone. What the 
law may lose in terms of consistency in it gains by acquiring a 
meaning that resonates with the citizen’s expectation of 
government and larger principles of justice.11 The moment of law-
making never truly ceases. It is no longer confined to the rules, 
statutes, or their formal application or interpretation; rather– the 
law evolves and is shaped each day by the lives it governs and their 
attempts to reconcile their own principles and expectations with its 
written word.  
                                                
7 See HART, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining that the use of competing sources of the law 
help give it meaning and context otherwise absent). 
8 Id. at 12. 
9 See, e.g., Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 857, 868 (1991). Smith’s work concluded that jurors were 
not influenced by the formality of substantive criminal law doctrines, and instead relied 
on prototypical representations drawn from their own lives and cultural identifications in 
reaching verdicts. Id. at 870. People, even when instructed otherwise, carry an intuitive 
perception that, in the context of juries, drives them towards a verdict which conforms 
with their normative sense of the world and the law’s role in it. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, 
PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY OF JUDGMENT 3 (1987). 
10 See Lawrence Sloan, The New Textualists’ New Text 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2027, 2041 
(2005) (offering prototypical reasoning as a methodology of interpretation). 
11 See HART, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining that the use of competing sources of the law 
help give it meaning and context otherwise absent). Though as will be discussed 
momentarily even methodologies of ad hoc judging as may present in nullification do not 
necessarily produce inconsistent results, at least not in the way Hart and others predicted. 
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This is not to say that the law is not without a point of reference. 
The shared history of the law – its writing, its prior application, its 
prior interpretation as precedent – all simultaneously offer a 
starting point for those who would ground the law in their own 
lives. But in moments when this history’s application is 
inconsistent with the citizen’s notion of the purpose of the law 
itself, he is not bound to rigidly and unthinkingly apply the law. 
Instead, a new construction of meaning is possible.  
The law, thus reconstructed, ceases to be a distant body and 
becomes a living part of our nomos our widely shared and deeply 
held social norms of our community.12 These norms construct our 
expectations about what behavior is permissible and what is 
forbidden. They form the basis of our belief systems and sense of 
justice.13 The written law is integrated so that it fits in the spaces of 
the citizens’ lives. The law takes on a meaning that encompasses 
not only the words written, applied and interpreted by the formal 
government, but also the cultural norms and expectations of the 
community it commands.14 When one conceives of the rule of law 
as nomos, the line around the formal and positive construction of 
law blurs and opens to a broader possibility of meaning. The rules, 
statutes and formalized interpretation still exist, but they are only 
part of an ongoing process of recognition.  
In this normative world, the line between law and unlawful is 
constantly made, challenged, and maintained. This line is defined 
by the narratives and cultural norms that locate it. In one 
community, it may exist in one form; in another its meaning shifts 
to be previously unrecognizable.15 The governed ground the law in 
their lives and in the process their relationship with the government 
is altered. In doing so, we as citizens accept an active role. We must 
discern our principles and compel the law to act upon them.16 We 
recognize that a true rule of law requires more than mere 
mechanical application of the law without reference to larger world 
in which it exists.17 We gather the meaning passed to us by the 
formal government, and we hold this meaning side-by-side to our 
own understanding and expectation. There may be little divergence 
between the two. We may accept the law as delivered, thankful that 
some other force did the heavy lifting of law-creation. But other 
times, this comparison may confound our sense of social norms. 
In these moments when our nomos, our widely shared and deeply 
held norms of our community, ring discordant with positive law, 
                                                
12 See Lawrence Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE 65 
(2006). 
13 See PAUL H. ROBINSON AND JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW4-8 (1995). 
14 Radin, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 808-09. 
15 Id. at 817 (arguing that a rule will control in practice only when there is strong public 
agreement surrounding it). 
16 Dworkin, supra note 35, at 96, 189-90 (requiring that in order for the rule of law to 
achieve full integration of the citizens’ perspective, “each citizen must accept demands 
on him, and may make demands on others…. Integrity therefore fuses citizens’ moral 
and political lives: it asks the good citizen…to interpret the common scheme of 
justice….”). 
17 See id. at 187-90. 
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our social norms likely provide a better guide to the “law in action” 
than the “law on the books”.18 In these times of disconnect, the 
legitimacy of the law may be undermined by the resulting 
uncertainties.  
When law and communal values no longer align, one possibility is 
that the police will not arrest; the prosecutors will not bring 
charges, and even if they do, the juries will not convict. In this 
scenario, the authority of the law is undermined by a wholesale 
refusal to accept the law as present. Another possibility produces 
equally uncertain results, police and prosecutors will pick and 
choose among cases for enforcement and juries will sometimes 
convict and sometimes acquit. In either case, the goal of a reliable, 
certain, and predictable law which girds the rule of law is 
undermined by strict reliance on positive law. 
In these moments of disconnect between the nomos and the positive 
law, giving the jury the power to nullify may actually increase the 
predictability of the law by seeking to realign the law with prevailing 
community values and expectations of the law. The nullified 
verdicts communicate to the formal branches of government that 
the citizenry will not sanction the enforcement and application of 
laws that are not aligned with the social norms and morality of the 
community. In the process, a new possibility of interpretation 
emerges, drawn not from those who constructed the law in the 
formal branches, but from those who live each day under the law.19  
Contextualized in the history of democracy, there is no small irony 
in understanding the law and government itself as requiring a 
fidelity to shared communal values.  
Compared to other moments of law-making – the legislator’s 
creation and codification, the executive’s enforcement, or the 
judiciary’s interpretation – nullification occupies a small space. By 
itself it cannot make law. It does not press a new meaning across 
the legal universe. It has no power to demand uniform deference 
to its will. It creates no precedent. In the larger world of the nomos, 
it is a near private moment that serves a unique function to press 
the community’s shared values onto the face of the law. Beyond 
this, nullification is a warning that whatever the formal construct 
of the law and governance, it exists apart from the citizen’s own 
understanding. It demands correction of constructs of the law that 
do not account for the citizen’s lived experience and expectations 
of the law as a result of those experiences. It is a call to interpretive 
commitment – a seizing of that active role of citizenship that open 
governance imagines. Viewed in this way, the jury’s ability to 
consider questions of law serves as a mechanism to lend 
predictability and knowability to the law and government when 
formal constructs have failed to align themselves with the citizen’s 
own expectations. 
                                                
18 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 32-3 (1910). 
19 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 102-11 (T. McCarthy, 
trans., Boston, 1984) (suggesting that the proper source of interpretation is not the people 
who wrote the text, but the people who live under it).  
The Criminal Jury, Nullfication, and Open Governance – Jenny E. Carroll 
– 36 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
Juror nullification is a challenge to the notion that law – once 
constructed, enforced and interpreted by the formal bodies of 
government – requires wholesale deference. It is a rejection of the 
premise that the citizen owes a duty of unquestioning obedience to 
the State and its construction of law above other competing 
allegiances.20 It pushes against an external construct of the law, in 
which the State defines the terms of the community it governs and 
then demands obedience to those terms as the cost of continued 
membership in the community.21 It recognizes instead that there are 
times when rejection of the law and government’s rigid perspective is 
a good thing – when the lives of the citizens are diminished by 
wholesale deference and improved by disobedience.22 While 
obedience to the law may create stability within a community, such 
obedience can also produce harm.23 Laws, left static, may fail to 
acknowledge the world as it actually exists, and may instead imagine 
circumstances as they may or could exist.24 Likewise, laws, even from 
the moment of their creation, may never have adequately accounted 
for or accommodated the lives of the citizens they govern.25 In 
these moments, it may be that the citizen, and not the government, 
is better able to access the value of the law and suggest counter 
meanings or interpretations.26 Indeed, the citizen’s continued 
allegiance to the law as constructed by formal bodies may alienate 
the citizen from her own values, her government, and her 
autonomy as a person.27 
In part, this is a recognition that in the process of compromise, 
settlement, and interpretation that informs the formal construction 
of the law, the citizen’s sovereignty may be lost. In these moments, 
whatever virtue is gained from this stable and unifying conception 
of law may simply come at too high a price for those left to live in 
the shadow of the constructed law. But it is also a recognition that 
if the government seeks to force an unquestioning deference to the 
                                                
20 See PHILLIP SOPER, THE ETHICS OF DEFERENCE: LEARNING FROM LAW’S MORALS 170, 
183 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
21 See GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 83, (arguing that law 
must spring from shared values to merit obedience); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: 
Revision and Tradition 174, in William Edmundson, ed. THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW: 
SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (Rowman & Littlefield 1999) (rejecting required 
obedience to laws that while promoting stability within a community fail to embody 
communal values). 
22 See MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: MEMBERSHIP, 
COMMITMENT, AND THE BONDS OF SOCIETY 279 (Clarendon Press 2006); David Hume, 
Of the Original Contract 268, in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed., HUME’S ETHICAL WRITINGS, (Notre 
Dame Univ. Press 1965); ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND 
WRITINGS, 1859-1865 (New York Library of America 1989) (all noting that disobedience 
to the law is often feared as contagious and therefore resulting in systematic instability, 
when in reality it may promote a more stable law by creating one that is more immediately 
responsive to the populous). 
23 See GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 98 (noting that laws 
may become outdated and thus fail to represent the needs of the citizens or may never 
have accounted for those needs in the first place). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. at 99. 
27 See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 14-15 (Univ. of California Press 
1998) (arguing that there will be times when personal autonomy and political authority 
are fundamentally incompatible). 
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law based on its status as “law” alone, without any effort to ground 
the legitimacy or justification of the law in the citizen’s own value 
system, the relationship between the citizen and government shifts. 
The government claims power for itself as the source not only of 
the law but of the value system that is bestowed on the citizenry 
through the creation, application, and interpretation of the law.  
Nullification pushes the opposite reality: that the power of 
governance, and so law creation, application, and interpretation, 
must flow from the citizen to the government. Members of the 
formal bodies that have created, codified, enforced and interpreted 
the law have done so as an act of delegation – by virtue of the 
citizen’s willingness to cede the power of governance to 
representatives. The fact of this delegation alone cannot displace 
the power of the citizen’s own normative judgments about the 
value of the law, measured by its ability to account for his own life 
and his own values.  
Nullification, even in the small space it occupies, is a safety valve 
in a world that might otherwise reduce self governance to a series 
of deferred loyalties and wholesale obedience. It is a constant 
reminder that the value of the law flows from the people, and that 
the formal decision-makers are agents – repositories of our 
delegated power – not the source of power itself.28 The law and 
government are not an external and foreign bodies, but a internal 
ones that are as fluid as our own shifting values, norms and 
expectations.29 
In this, it may seem that nullification renders the law and the 
government that produces it less knowable, less constant, and ad 
hoc. The fear of inconsistent verdicts and their effect is powerful. 
The horrific history of nullifying verdicts in the United States 
serves as a reminder of the power of this near private moment 
when compounded across a community.30 But this first impression 
ignores equally valid realities. Nullification is an act of integration 
– it seeks to map the formally constructed law onto the lives of the 
governed and, in the process, preserve the underlying value of law 
itself. It is a moment of direct citizen interpretation that pushes the 
law to account for a previously excluded perspective. It renders the 
law a body in motion from its static origins. It is a moment of voice 
and exit – expressing dissatisfaction within the confines of the walls 
of the system and rejecting law that would exclude the citizen’s own 
experience. Within the open government movement, this is 
consistent with an expanded vision of the law, and there is inherent 
value to it. Nullification shelters an outlying narrative that channels 
the power of interpretation and enforcement away from the 
government, and toward the people, in ways that promote the 
underlying values of the democracy. Nullification drives the law to 
                                                
28 See GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 102. 
29 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 56 (Yale Univ. Press 2001). 
30 The history of nullification surrounding the Fugitive Slave Act in the North offers a 
positive counterpoint to this negative memory. See Foreman, supra note Erreur ! Le 
signet n’est pas défini., at 899-901. 
31 Solum, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini.; Anne Bowen Pouline, The Jury: 
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bend toward the citizen’s conceived notion of justice, whether that 
notion is drawn from their understanding of the law or some 
competing narrative in their own lives.31 
That the citizen juror’s sense of justice may be inconsistent with or 
in direct conflict with a larger national sense does not undermine 
its value or displace it as a possible source of law. Discordant and 
divergent perspectives play a valuable role in the creation and 
interpretation of law and guide governance decisions.32 
Acknowledging the difference between the State’s formal 
construction of the law and the citizen’s own sense of it pushes 
against a complacency that would suggest that government must 
maintain only one perspective. Divergence rebels against a notion 
that we as individual citizens are truly singular in our identities. 
Rather, we are the complex and multifaceted sons and daughters 
of those early revolutionaries (whether actually or metaphorically) 
who risked their lives rather than offer blind obedience to a 
government so distant that they could no longer recognize 
themselves in the laws that sought to govern them. Nullification 
empowers a forum for our dissent within the larger construct of 
government – even if it is only in a small space like a jury room or 
on a verdict form. Even that small moment can serve as a catalyst 
for change when it resonates with a broader community.33 In a 
world that struggles to produce a nationalized consensus, 
nullification is a reminder that local forums may be better suited to 
serve as proving grounds for the dynamic beliefs of the citizenry. 
Nullification also opens other possibilities. Just as it opens a space 
for competing voices in the larger body politic, it opens up the 
possibility of a law constructed in spaces that acknowledge the 
horizontal and vertical components of citizens’ lives. In this it 
offers the possibility of integrating the competing pluralisms that 
compose the lives of the governed and imagines a law that seeks to 
account for shifting allegiances and identities even as it seeks to 
establish law  
People exist horizontally and vertically. Their identities are a 
combination of traits, beliefs or associations that groups them 
along these competing axes. They are vertical in relation to formal 
hierarchy. In the terms of governance, they are citizen and/or 
elected or appointed officials. Their formal role in the creation of 
law is defined by the vertical space or spaces they occupy. A citizen 
votes.34 He hopes to elect a representative whom he then hopes 
                                                
31 Solum, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini.; Anne Bowen Pouline, The Jury: 
The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1380, 1383 (1994) 
(noting “[t]o achieve one of law’s ends – justice – we must sometimes abandon law’s 
means, such as rule application”). 
32 See Heather Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 
(2010). 
33 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (noting that part of the 
power of nullification is to serve as a locus for attention in moments when the application 
of the law in a community is inconsistent with either stated government policy, or the 
sentiment of the larger state or national communities). 
34 See GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 47 (noting that formal 
government offers little opportunity for direct citizen voice outside of casting a ballot). 
35 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii-xix; 54-58 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993) 
The Criminal Jury, Nullfication, and Open Governance – Jenny E. Carroll 
– 39 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
will implement policies consistent with the citizen’s own values or 
expectations. If the representative fails in that assigned role or the 
citizen changes his mind on what he expects from the 
representative, the citizen is still confined to the remedies of the 
vertical space he occupies. For most citizens, this space is a bottom 
rung in the vertical hierarchy of governance. The citizen is 
common. He is the mass that elects the few that govern from a 
higher vertical space then his own. Those few – the members of 
higher echelons of this vertical construct – write laws, execute laws 
or interpret laws depending on which branch of vertical space they 
occupy. They are the formal lawmakers. They simultaneously 
represent and govern. Their words become law. The citizen waits 
for their pronouncements to tell him what is or is not permitted. 
But people also occupy horizontal spaces. Spread out across the 
plane that is personhood, individuals simultaneously answer to 
different names, different identities. Some may be disjunctive; a 
citizen is a man or woman, son or daughter, husband or wife, or 
partner or single. He is Jewish, or Protestant, or Catholic, or 
Islamic, or Buddhist, or Zoroastrian, or some other religion, or 
agnostic. Others are conjunctive: he is a sports enthusiast and a 
knitter and a florist and a clarinetist and the author of an award-
winning series of ladies’ romance novels set in nineteenth-century 
England. He supports equal rights, but not gay marriage. He is pro 
life and pro death penalty. He owns a gun, but supports gun 
restrictions.  
The list goes on and on in any of a multitude of combinations. The 
details don’t matter as much as the recognition that people draw 
their identities from many sources. These sources at times may 
crash against one another in a struggle for value dominance. Should 
this citizen vote for municipal bonds that fund a new hockey arena 
or an orchestra hall? Should he push for state-run health insurance 
to cover independent contractors like authors that might also fund 
abortions for women in lower income brackets? In each of these 
decisions, he weighs the competing values of his horizontal identity 
in order to exercise his vertical one. He seeks to reconcile the 
pluralism that is his life. In this process of reconciliation, questions 
of obedience and deference inevitably loom. On the one hand, 
theories of liberal governance would support the notion that the 
citizen owes deference to the law – even laws that conflict with the 
citizen’s underlying moral values.35 On the other hand, the citizen 
may ask whether he owes deference to formally constructed law 
                                                
35 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii-xix; 54-58 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993) 
(arguing that mutual concepts of justice mandate obedience to laws, even if the moral 
basis for the law may diverge from the citizen’s own sense of morality); RAWLS, supra note 
Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 115, 344, 351, 354-55 (contending that if a state 
meets the minimum requirements of legitimacy then the citizen has a moral duty of 
obedience to the institution including a duty to obey laws, even if the citizen fids such 
laws unjust). Ronald Dworkin would reach a similar conclusion, but for different reasons. 
See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 166, 180 (stating that citizens owe a duty of obedience out 
of an associative obligation). 
36 See GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 1 (asking the question 
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and the government above all other constructs of social value and 
competing pluralism?36 
As an informal source of law, nullification offers a mechanism to 
allow citizens to explore pluralism in the context of real applied 
law. In a jury room a citizen may well be engaged in the same 
process of compromise that informs the participation of his 
vertical self in the context of formal law-making. But the jury room 
also opens the possibility that, when given the chance to explore 
his horizontal self in the context of the application of the law, he 
may reach a different conclusion. Even the man who supports gun 
control legislation in general may weigh his competing allegiances 
differently when asked to apply that gun control to a fellow knitter 
who defended herself with an illegally possessed firearm. In this 
process of compromise, the nullifying juror opens a new realm of 
law – one that seeks to integrate the competing internal identities 
of the citizen. Nullification challenges the notion that obedience to 
the law and faith in the government enjoy only one construct. It 
suggests instead that just as liberal governance implores the citizen 
to be faithful to the law, so those who would make and interpret 
law must be faithful to competing sources of meaning that in 
different contexts may push competing norms of identity to the 
surface when the law is placed in our normative world. 
In this nullification serves many masters. It elevates a previously 
excluded voice within the confines of formal government and 
pushes back against an unresponsive construction of law, while 
opening up a new forum for expression of the citizen’s competing 
values and ideals.37 But it also offers a moment of reconciliation 
between the formal construction and the citizen’s conception of 
law that saves the whole by forcing an alteration or an exception, 
rather than wholesale rebellion. It creates a space in the 
government for those who might otherwise be forced to exit.38 The 
nullified verdict is a warning of a perceived distance between the 
citizen’s sense of justice in a single case and the law itself. Like all 
warnings, it can fall on deaf ears, or if heard it can fail to resonate 
with a larger audience that might effectuate some change. But in 
those moments when it does resonate, it is a call to produce a more 
responsive law – one that is truly created by the people and not 
handed to them whole from the government that, once receiving 
                                                
36 See GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 1 (asking the question 
of why obedience to law requires competing norms including religious, familial or social 
values to be rendered subservient to those promoted by the state). 
37 Divergent perspectives presented as nullified verdicts can serve as catalyst for change, 
energizing a national response to local rule. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES, supra note, at 869-70 (arguing that “consistent acquittals (by all white juries) in 
state criminal courts in the American South in the early 1960s” helped fuel the Civil Rights 
movement). While the nullified verdict may be devastating for those who counted on a 
particular application of the law, it carries far more force as a motivator towards some 
change, than any power it wields independently, on its own. In this even nullified verdicts 
grounded in the prejudice of a community may serve as valuable witnesses to the 
oppressive power of that community. 
38 See Gerken, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that we should not ignore the role that divergent 
voices can play in a functioning democracy, forcing an integration of minority 
perspectives and “forcing integration rather than exit”). 
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their votes, can easily blend into a ruling class with no true 
connection to the citizens it serves.  
In a world where many citizens do not vote, even in local elections, 
because they sense that their vote won’t matter, a vote in a room 
of twelve fellow citizens lifts this hopelessness. A jury vote – every 
jury vote – matters. One jury vote can be the difference between a 
conviction and a hung jury. What the jury lacks by way of an 
“empire,” with its limited power and jurisdiction, it makes up for 
as a site of meaningful “minority” rule in the face of a nationalistic 
push toward consensus that the community may not accept.39 In 
this sense, nullification does not undermine or merely correct the 
imperfections of the law – it offers a moment of meaningful 
democracy, and relief from the rigors of a formalist construction.40 
This construct of jury as a source of law is consistent with the 
Founders’ own distrust of concentrations of power within the 
democracy. Just as the three branches serve as a system of multiple 
checking mechanisms on the power of formal government, the jury 
as a source of law forces an accounting with the possibility of an 
alternative interpretation of (or even rejection of) the law.41  
In this sense, nullification creates a more knowable, more 
consistent law, insofar as it conforms to the citizens’ expectations 
of the law in their own communities. It is true to the nomos. 
Nullification requires that twelve citizens – with no further 
qualifications than their inability to avoid jury duty – come to a 
consensus about the law that contradicts the one promoted by 
formal government. This suggests a depth of feeling regarding the 
state of the law that is both intransient and consistent among and 
across those individuals chosen as jurors on a particular case.42 In 
agreeing to nullify they are seeking to drive the law back towards 
themselves. They create a law that is knowable to them in a tangible 
way by refusing to apply it to their fellow citizen. 
In this, nullification, while certainly limited by both its effect (a single 
verdict) and its participants (jurors on a single criminal case), answers 
some concerns about the possibility that it engenders or encourages 
random or improper verdicts. But further consideration of the process 
of deliberation also suggests that random or improper verdicts are 
unlikely, even if jurors are permitted to judge questions of law. To the 
extent that we trust majorities to make democratic decisions in other 
context (such as the election of representatives), we profess some faith 
that a “correct” decision can be reached by the majority so long as each 
participating member is making a decision that is better than a random 
decision.43 While it is always possible that a juror, like a member of any 
                                                
39 Id. at 27. 
40 Bowen, supra note 31, at 1383. 
41 GREENE, supra note Erreur ! Le signet n’est pas défini., at 103 (noting that the 
Founders not only created multiple branches of government, but forced those branches 
to compete for the citizen’s allegiance thereby installing a constant reminder that the 
citizen, not the government, is the ultimate source of power within the democracy). 
42 In order to nullify a verdict, jurors must reach a consensus to nullify. Absent this 
consensus, a juror can certainly cause a hung trial, but cannot nullify. 
43 See David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, Informaiton Aggregation, Rationality, and the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 34 (1996). 
The Criminal Jury, Nullfication, and Open Governance – Jenny E. Carroll 
– 42 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
electorate, will vote randomly, the hope is that the process of jury 
selection will minimize that possibility. That instead, jurors will cast 
their verdict votes based on their understanding of the case before 
them and so are as likely as any majority to arrive at a “correct” and 
non-random decision. 
But analysis of the jury decision making process is admittedly tricky 
in ways that other democratic process may not be. The jury may be 
a counter intuitive tool of open governance. To the extent that jury 
deliberation is both veiled in secrecy vis a vis the outside world and 
is available only to the chosen few, the mechanism of jury selection 
becomes critical. A failure to include a variety of community 
perspectives on a jury is not only to risk that a verdict that fails to 
reflect communal values, but if the verdict is a nullified one, it may 
undermine the stability of the law and reinforces oppressive 
regimes. Evidence of continued exclusion of particular classes of 
individuals and perspectives must be addressed if the promise of 
nullification as a means of infusing the law with communal values 
is to be realized.  
As the Court, and all of us, struggles to define the role of the citizen 
in our modern government, some salience emerges. We, as citizens, 
are a powerful source of meaning. Every day we construct a law 
that flows from the bottom upward, pushing against an 
increasingly distant and elite government.44 But we are also a 
dangerous force when our own concept of justice is grounded in 
prejudice or “cruel, cruel, ignorance.”45  
CONCLUSION 
In any government, there are different corridors of power. Some 
are occupied by formal decision makers – elected or appointed – 
who construct, enforce, and interpret law in an “official” capacity; 
others by less formal power brokers. Lately in the United States 
and elsewhere, there has been much debate about the continued 
failures of official actors. In the United States infighting among 
formal actors has seemed to descend into an inevitable and 
dizzying cacophony of partisanship and allegiance to specialized 
interest. In the wake of this dysfunction, citizen movements have 
decried the ever-increasing distance between the formalized space 
of government and the “people”. Citizens have taken to the streets 
to protest and to “occupy” more formal corridors of power; private 
citizen actors have spirited secret government data-collection 
protocols to online sources; they have landed helicopters on the 
capitol lawn – all in the name of reclaiming the government and 
more formal chambers of power. To speak of open government is 
                                                
44 The Court, in defining the role of the jury has again and again stressed that one function 
of the jury is to guard against government oppression and to reject law which if unjust in 
its construction of application. See Ice, 555 U.S. at 167-68; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306; 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-85; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156-57; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Johnson 
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 406 U.S. 78, 87 (1970). 
45 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD. 
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therefore to speak of a reclamation of the formal spaces of 
governance. 
But in this movement to open government, the quieter corridrs of 
power have often been overlooked. These other spaces of 
governance are occupied by the citizens themselves, in venues 
where their lives bump against formal law and lawmaking. In these 
small empires, the citizen participates in governance and the 
construction of law itself. From voting to boycott to jury 
nullification, citizens can and do claim spaces in which they can 
assert their views unfiltered (or relatively unfiltered) by larger 
power structures. One of the most powerful of these small realms 
is the criminal jury box. 
Citizen jurors in criminal cases are in a unique position to assess 
the legitimacy of the government’s exercise of power at the 
moment its power directly touches a fellow citizen – the criminal 
defendant. To recognize this reality is to recognize that jurors serve 
a greater role than mere fact finders – they serve as legal 
interpreters, instilling a community-based interpretation of the law 
in their verdict. Whether determining an appropriate charge as a 
grand juror or guilt as a petit juror, jurors push for an expansion of 
governance that encompasses not only formal spheres of power 
but also less formal ones in the form of direct citizen governance. 
As such, juries serve as a vital, and oft overlooked, mechanism of 
open government – forcing a transparency and power-sharing 
between formal and informal constructs and collaboration among 
the citizens serving as jurors to reach a verdict. 
This system is not without its failings: the obscurity of jury 
selection and deliberation; the controlled universe of information 
shared with the jury as evidence, argument, and jury instruction; 
the secrecy shrouding the basis of the subsequent verdict. All of 
these might counsel against characterizing the jury as a mechanism 
of open governance (and might explain why no one else is talking 
about it in the context of the open government conversation). But 
this hesitation takes a myopic view of the jury’s role and 
composition. It overlooks and undervalues the fundamental nature 
of the jury as a body of citizen actors weighing power and the 
meaning of the government’s power. Whatever shortcomings it 
possesses counsel toward an alteration of the process surrounding 
jury construction and deliberation, not the rejection of it as a body 
of open governance. 
As the open government movement pushes for participation and 
collaboration in the grander spaces of government, the informal 
realms of governance may offer an equally significant opportunity 
to achieve such goals. This paper explores the role of the jury as a 
citizen decision maker in the open government movement, arguing 
that in juries may lie one of the greatest opportunities for 
meaningful citizen participation in governance. 
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